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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

BELLING THE CAT: IMPLEMENTATION OF A PROSPECTIVE
PAYMENT REIMBURSEMENT SYSTEM FOR CRITICAL ACCESS
HOSPITALS, ITS LIKELY SUCCESS, AND POLITICAL
IMPLICATIONS OF THIS POLICY MOVE

Health care is plagued by inefficient reimbursement policies which encourage
expensive financial waste with little incentive to maintain care quality. Though
no perfect solution exists, effective remedies may require a hard look at
programs so far untouched by policy changes. This article discusses the
application of a prospective payment system of reimbursement for critical
access hospitals, as well as how this policy change would affect rural health
care access, costs, and quality of care. Though some fear prospective payment
systems of reimbursement would cripple rural health care, evidence shows it
would likely promote more cost-efficient care without diminishing quality or
outcomes. Further, there are a number of steps critical access hospitals may
take to ensure survival and profitability, and in considering the need for more
responsible health care spending, such a change may eventually prove
necessary.
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I. INTRODUCTION
1

A notable fable depicts a council of mice congregating secretly to discuss
measures they could take to outwit their longstanding enemy—the household
cat—which had the frightening propensity of silently sneaking up on the mice,
remaining undetected until it had captured its unwary victims. Many potential
remedies were discussed; however, one mouse brilliantly ventured that the
problem might be solved by using a ribbon to attach a small bell to the cat’s
neck, providing warning to the mice when the cat approached. Amid the
congregation’s applause upon hearing this plan, an old mouse stood and
remarked, “That is all very well, but who is to bell the [c]at?”2
For policymakers, changes in provider reimbursements often echo the old
mouse’s concerns––though necessary, no policymaker wishes to be the first to
“bell the cat” that might swallow his or her political career. With the federal
health care budget soaring at unprecedented levels, policymakers have
gradually shifted health care providers from systems of reasonable cost
reimbursement (RCR) to a prospective payment system (PPS). These efforts
have aimed to curb health care costs and encourage providers to offer more
efficient, cost-effective care. However, for financial and political reasons,
critical access hospitals (CAHs) have escaped this political migration. Though
evidence demonstrates a move would likely be successful in creating a more
efficient, cost-effective rural health system, many providers claim a change to
PPS would leave America’s most vulnerable rural populations with no access
to care. 3 This concern is valid. However, this article demonstrates that it is not
insurmountable and that the rural health care system, in the long run, would
likely benefit from such a change.
This article analyzes the proposal to shift CAHs to PPS reimbursement, as
well as the practical and political effects of such a switch on rural health care
provision. First, Section II outlines the history of the PPS reimbursement, the
CAH exception to this system, and why this exception was created. Section III
examines the proposed move of CAHs to PPS reimbursement, the fears and
risks accompanying the policy proposal, and how such a switch would affect
CAHs based on evidentiary studies. Finally, Section IV discusses the very real
challenges of a move to PPS for CAHs and how these should be addressed by
policymakers and health care providers to ensure not only survival but also
financial viability and enhanced quality of care. Ultimately, this article
demonstrates that a switch to PPS would not prove the crippling blow to CAHs

1. Aesop, Aesop’s Fables, Retold by Joseph Jacobs, in HARVARD CLASSICS (Charles W.
Eliot & Joseph Jacobs eds., 1909), http://www.bartleby.com/17/1/67.html.
2. Id.
3. Michelle M. Casey et al., Minimum-Distance Requirements Could Harm HighPerforming Critical-Access Hospitals and Rural Communities, 34 HEALTH AFF. 627, 633 (2015).
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as predicted; CAHs would not only survive, but would adapt to provide more
cost-effective, quality care.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE CAH SYSTEM AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION
In the battles for policy change, rural health care has historically escaped
the brutal fray of budget cuts, enhanced conditions of participation,
reimbursement rate reductions, practice regulations, and staffing
requirements. 4 This is particularly true for more vulnerable hospitals such as
CAHs, which traditionally maintain thin financial margins, 5 bear heavier
percentages of low-income individuals and sicker populations, 6 and lack the
ability to shift losses to privately covered individuals. 7 Additionally, rural
populations are much less likely to have health insurance. 8 Though the
majority of American hospitals receive PPS reimbursement, 9 it has long been
recognized that rural hospitals provide access to health care for some of
America’s most vulnerable populations, and thus policy has tended to favor
their survival through generous reimbursement policies. 10 To understand how a
switch to PPS reimbursement would affect CAHs and their care provision, it is
important to provide some background context on CAHs and PPS
reimbursement.
A.

CAHs and Their Role in Rural Health Care Delivery

CAHs were created as a measure to counteract a series of rural hospital
closures, which sparked concerns that legislative action was needed to reduce
the financial vulnerability of these hospitals and ultimately to save rural health

4. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(S)(ii)(III) (2012) (showing that recent across-theboard payment reductions for outpatient hospital services were held inapplicable to community
hospitals and critical access hospitals). See also generally Act of Dec. 13, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95210, 91 Stat. 1485 (Medicare-certified Rural Health Clinics (RHCs)).
5. See NAT’L RURAL HEALTH RESOURCE CTR., CRITICAL ACCESS HOSPITAL 2012
FINANCIAL LEADERSHIP SUMMIT 6 (2012), https://www.ruralcenter.org/tasc/resources/criticalaccess-hospital-2012-financial-leadership-summit-summary. Compare these margins with total
aggregate hospital profit margins, which generally remain above four percent. AM. HOSP. ASS’N,
TRENDWATCH CHARTBOOK 2016: TRENDS IN HOSPITAL FINANCING tbl. 4.1 (Sept. 1, 2016),
http://www.aha.org/research/reports/tw/chartbook/2016/chapter4.pdf.
6. Jin Young Choi, A Portrait of Rural Health in America, 27 J. RURAL SOC. SCI. 1, 2
(2012).
7. Id. at 4.
8. Id.
9. See generally 42 C.F.R. §§ 412.20 to .30 (2015).
10. See 42 C.F.R. § 419.20(b)(2) (2015) (“Critical access hospitals (CAHs) are excluded
from the hospital outpatient prospective payment system.”).
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care from collapse. 11 In an attempt to salvage the rural health care system,
Congress enacted legislation as part of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 that
allowed states to designate certain rural hospitals as CAHs. 12 Under CAH
designation, hospitals receive more favorable Medicare reimbursement
rates 13—they are reimbursed at 101% of all reasonable costs 14 “for outpatient,
inpatient, laboratory and therapy services, as well as post-acute care in . . .
hospital[] swing beds.” 15 Unlike traditional PPS, these costs are not based on
the type or number of services provided. 16
Hospitals must meet and maintain compliance with certain legal criteria to
gain CAH status. 17 Among these, a hospital must: (1) be a nonprofit or public
hospital located in a rural county or more than a thirty-five mile drive (or a
fifteen mile mountainous drive) away from another hospital; 18 (2) maintain
twenty-four hour emergency care services; 19 (3) have no more than twenty-five
acute care inpatient beds, for which each individual stay is not to exceed a
period of ninety-six hours (unless exempted or waived); 20 and (4) meet staffing

11. Critical Access Hospitals (CAHs), RURAL HEALTH INFO. HUB, https://www.ruralhealth
info.org/topics/critical-access-hospitals (last modified Apr. 8, 2015) [hereinafter RURAL
HEALTH].
12. Id.
13. See generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., ICN 006400, RURAL HEALTH
SERIES: CRITICAL ACCESS HOSPITAL (Feb. 2016).
14. “Reasonable cost,” in part, is defined as follows:
The reasonable cost of any services shall be the cost actually incurred, excluding
therefrom any part of incurred cost found to be unnecessary in the efficient delivery of
needed health services, and shall be determined in accordance with regulations
establishing the method or methods to be used, and the items to be included, in
determining such costs for various types or classes of institutions, agencies, and
services . . . . Such regulations shall (i) take into account both direct and indirect costs of
providers of services (excluding therefrom any such costs, including standby costs, which
are determined in accordance with regulations to be unnecessary in the efficient delivery
of services covered by the insurance programs established under this subchapter) in order
that, under the methods of determining costs, the necessary costs of efficiently delivering
covered services to individuals covered by the insurance programs established by this
subchapter will not be borne by individuals not so covered, and the costs with respect to
individuals not so covered will not be borne by such insurance programs.
42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A) (2012). The Secretary is given the discretion to define “reasonable
cost” as well as the “items to be included” under such reasonable costs. Id.
15. MEDPAC, CRITICAL ACCESS HOSPITALS PAYMENT SYSTEM 1 (Oct. 2016).
16. Id.
17. Balanced Budget Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 105-133 § 4201, 111 Stat. 370. See also
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 13; Critical Access Hospitals, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/medicare/provider-enrollment-and-certifi
cation/certificationandcomplianc/cahs.html (last modified Apr. 9, 2013).
18. 42 C.F.R. § 485.610 (2011) (“Condition of participation: Status and location”).
19. 42 C.F.R. § 485.618 (2016) (“Emergency services”).
20. 42 C.F.R. § 485.620 (“Number of beds and length of stay”).
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requirements for hospitals located in rural areas, with certain exceptions, 21 as
well as requirements for Medicare participation. 22 The hospital must also
currently participate in Medicare. 23
In addition to conditions of participation, 24 conditions of payment also
apply. These conditions of payment apply differently to inpatient and
outpatient services. To receive payment for inpatient services, covered under
Medicare Part A, a physician must provide a certification that includes: (1) an
order in which the physician reasonably expects the patient to require a stay
crossing two midnights, which involves medically necessary inpatient
services; 25 (2) the reason for inpatient services; 26 (3) estimated time the patient
will require in the hospital; 27 (4) plans for post-hospital care (if necessary); 28
and (5) certification that the patient is reasonably expected to be discharged or
transferred within ninety-six hours of admission. 29
For outpatient services, CAHs may be paid under one of two methods.
Under the Standard Payment Method, a CAH receives 101% of reasonable
costs for CAH outpatient facility services. 30 If the CAH chooses to opt out of
the Standard Payment Method, it may choose reimbursement under the
Optional Payment Method, which permits reimbursement of reasonable costs

21. 42 C.F.R. § 485.631 (“Staffing and staff responsibilities”).
22. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 370 (1997) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. 1395i-4 (2010)); 42 C.F.R. § 485.601-647.
23. 42 C.F.R. § 485.635 (“Condition of participation: Provision of services”); 42 C.F.R. §
485.612 (“Condition of Participation: Compliance with Hospital Requirements at the Time of
Application”). See also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 13.
24. In addition to the above-mentioned conditions of participation, other conditions of
participation also apply. See 42 C.F.R. § 485.627 (dealing with the organizational structure and
government of the CAH); 42 C.F.R. § 485.616 (noting the necessity of agreements with at least
one other hospital in the case that the CAH is part of a rural health network); 42 C.F.R. § 485.641
(describing quality assurance review); 42 C.F.R. § 485.638 (providing standards for maintaining
clinical records); 42 C.F.R. § 485.639 (listing requirements regarding surgical safety); 42 C.F.R.
§ 485.643 (providing requirements regarding tissue procurement protocols); 42 C.F.R. § 485.645
(noting special requirements for CAHs providing long-term care services); and 42 C.F.R. §
485.647 (describing special requirements for CAHs providing psychiatric and rehabilitation
units). However, these conditions of participation are either requirements generally applied to
hospitals (both CAH and non-CAH), or are not applied to all CAHs. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. §§
485.639, 485.643, 485.645, 485.647.
25. Fact Sheet: Two-Midnight Rule, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (July 1,
2015), https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2015-Fact-sheets-i
tems/2015-07-01-2.html.
26. 42 C.F.R. § 424.13(a)(1) (2015).
27. Id. § 424.13(a)(2).
28. Id. § 424.13(a)(3).
29. 42 C.F.R. § 424.15(a) (2015). See also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
supra note 13, at 3.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1395m(g)(1) (2015).
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of facility services plus 115% for professional services if the physician or
practitioner has reassigned his or her billing rights to the CAH. 31
CAHs may also be reimbursed for ambulance transportation if the CAH is
the sole provider or supplier of ambulance transports located within a thirtyfive mile drive of the CAH and, if there is no other provider or supplier of
ambulance supports within a thirty-five mile drive, the CAH owns and
operates an entity furnishing ambulance transports that is more than a thirtyfive mile drive from the CAH if that ambulance provider is the closest provider
to the CAH. 32
Currently, there are 1,332 certified CAHs throughout the United States, 33
mostly concentrated in northern, rural states. 34 Since the implementation of the
Rural Hospital Flexibility Program, CAHs have fared with notable success,
though they have generally maintained thinner margins than normally
experienced by urban hospitals. 35 Rural hospitals also face more challenges
than their urban counterparts. 36 Twenty-three percent of the population, 37 or
about 60,000,000 individuals, 38 live in rural areas, and rural residents tend to
be older, 39 with more health problems, 40 and lower incomes. 41 Rural residents
31. Id. § 1395m(g)(2).
32. Id. § 1395m(l)(8). See also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 13, at
4.
33. RURAL HEALTH, supra note 11.
34. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MEDICARE: LEGISLATIVE MODIFICATIONS HAVE
RESULTED IN PAYMENT ADJUSTMENTS FOR MOST HOSPITALS 24–26 (Apr. 2013) (noting that
CAHs are predominantly located in the central states; in 2012, North Dakota and Montana had
the largest percentage of hospitals designated as CAHs at eighty-four and seventy-nine percent,
respectively).
35. THE NAT’L ADVISORY COMM. ON RURAL HEALTH, A TARGETED LOOK AT THE RURAL
HEALTH CARE SAFETY NET 9–10, 19 (Apr. 2002), (explaining that rural hospitals are less able to
balance financial losses by shifting costs to third-party payers, largely due to the significant
number of uninsured patients rural hospitals typically cover).
36. AM. HOSP. ASS’N, supra note 5, at 1.
37. Id. at 2.
38. H.R. 3225, 116th Cong. (2015).
39. Currently, rural America is home to more than fifty-nine million people. Choi, supra
note 6, at 1. Of these individuals, a disproportionate number are elderly. See M.K. Miller et al.,
Rural Populations and Their Health, in RURAL HEALTH SERVICES: A MANAGEMENT
PERSPECTIVE 3, 9–10 (Joyce E. Beaulieu & David E. Berry eds., 1994). “More than seventeen
percent of rural individuals are sixty-five or older, versus thirteen percent of the total United
States population.” Choi, supra note 6.
40. Choi, supra note 6 (noting that rural areas experience significantly greater health care
needs than the general United States population, as rural residents tend to have much poorer
health than urban residents. Chronic health conditions such as diabetes and cardiovascular disease
are much more common, as well as obesity, mental illness, and disability). See also The
Affordable Care Act – What It Means for Rural America, HHS.GOV (Sep. 30, 2013),
http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts-and-features/fact-sheets/what-aca-means-for-rural-america/
index.html.
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are also more likely to be uninsured 42 or to receive coverage under Medicare
and Medicaid. 43 Because nearly sixty percent of gross revenues to rural
hospitals come from Medicare and Medicaid, CAHs are also particularly
sensitive to policy changes, especially regarding reimbursement rates. 44
Persistent physician shortages in rural areas only emphasize financial strains. 45
“Seventy-seven percent of rural counties . . . are designated as primary care
health professional shortage areas while [nine] percent [of rural counties] have
no physicians at all.” 46 However, the CAH system has mitigated some of the
unique struggles faced by rural providers.
Though the CAH program has afforded many benefits to rural health
systems in light of the unique challenges they face, the rising costs of rural
health care, as well as the lack of incentives for providing cost-effective care
under RCR, have raised persistent doubts about the CAH program’s
effectiveness. These benefits and detriments are highlighted next.
1. The Benefits of CAHs in Rural Health Care Provision
The CAH system has undeniably benefited struggling rural hospitals. The
most prominent benefit is financial. Not only has the 101% reimbursement rate

41. High uninsurance rates are exacerbated by the lower income levels typically found in
rural areas; the average per capita rural income is $28,781 versus the $40,570 found in urban
areas. See Choi, supra note 6. Rural counties also comprise eighty-one percent of counties
designated as suffering persistent child poverty, and one-fourth of the nonelderly rural population
has a family income below poverty level. Id.
42. AM. HOSP. ASS’N, supra note 5, at 2. See also Jon M. Bailey, The Top 10 Rural Issues
for Health Care Reform, CTR. FOR RURAL AFF., Mar. 2009, at 1, 1 (individuals are less insured
and thus more dependent on the insurance market); Jennifer Lenardson et al., Health Insurance
Profile Indicates Need to Expand Coverage in Rural Areas, in RURAL HEALTH RES. & POL’Y
CTRS., CHALLENGES FOR IMPROVING HEALTH CARE ACCESS IN RURAL AMERICA 11, 11 (20092010) (the rate of uninsured is as high as twenty-three percent, compared to the nineteen percent
rate found in urban areas; these rates have not changed since 1997).
43. Choi, supra note 6, at 4.
44. AM. HOSP. ASS’N, supra note 5, at 4.
45. RURAL HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES vii (Thomas C. Ricketts, III ed., 1999) (showing
that even though rural Americans comprise twenty percent of the nation’s population, only nine
percent of physicians practice in rural areas. Additionally, rural patients tend to utilize physicians
less frequently and consequently tend to have longer rates of hospital stays). Rural areas also face
difficulties in attracting medical staff; physicians and other health professionals are retained at
historically low rates. See Senator Craig Thomas, Understanding Rural Health Care Needs &
Challenges: Why Access Matters to Rural Americans, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 253, 257 (2006).
Hospital vacancies for registered nurses, radiology technicians, and pharmacists are all greater
than ten percent. Id. Moreover, one in seven hospitals face severe nursing shortages; more than
twenty percent of nursing positions have not been filled. Id. One of the reasons for this difficulty
in attracting medical staff is the isolation inherent in rural areas; this has been somewhat
mitigated through the construction of rural health networks. Id.
46. H.R. 3225, 116th Cong. (2015).
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afforded the ability to provide care in areas otherwise inaccessible to hospitals,
higher reimbursement rates for telehealth services at CAHs have allowed even
more extensive access to care for isolated and elderly rural residents. 47
Furthermore, CAHs receive reimbursement for 101% of the costs of training
full-time equivalent residents in approved residency training programs at the
CAH, which has allowed smaller hospitals to recruit and train vital health care
professionals. 48 Similarly, pass-through exemptions allow for CAHs to be paid
at RCR rates for certified registered nurse anesthetist services, which give
CAHs funds needed to attract these vital professionals to practice in designated
health professional shortage areas (HPSAs). 49 In certified HPSAs, physicians
may receive a ten percent bonus payment for outpatient professional services
furnished to a Medicare patient. 50 Finally, CAHs may receive generous grants
of up to $50,000 from the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services 51 for planning and implementing rural health care plans, 52
establishing or expanding rural emergency health services, 53 or technologically
upgrading various hospital systems. 54 These financial benefits have provided
enormous aid to smaller, geographically isolated hospitals. 55
Furthermore, CAHs have successfully invested these financial benefits
back into their communities 56 by contributing significantly to local economic
sustainability. For example, one city in Kentucky demonstrated the pronounced
success of the CAH system by examining the difference in impact on the local
community both before and after the conversion of local hospitals to CAH
status. 57 Investments poured into funding local CAHs, which ultimately
exhibited successful rates of return between 1.20 and 1.55 times for total local
industry output, 1.23 to 1.64 times for employment levels, and 1.12 to 1.48
times for income levels. 58 Accordingly, the rate of return on an investment in

47. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 13, at 6 (noting that Medicare is
to reimburse designated providers for eighty percent of the costs of telehealth services utilized).
See also generally DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TELEHEALTH SERVICES 2 (2015).
48. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 13, at 2.
49. Id. at 7. See also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CMS MANUAL SYSTEM:
PUB 100-04 MEDICARE CLAIMS PROCESSING: TRANSMITTAL 2719 (2013).
50. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 13, at 2.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-4(g)(3)(D) (2016).
52. Id. § 1395i-4(g)(1).
53. Id. § 1395i-4(g)(2).
54. Id. § 1395i-4(g)(3).
55. ILL. CRITICAL ACCESS HOSP. NETWORK, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE CRITICAL
ACCESS HOSPITAL PROGRAM ON ILLINOIS COMMUNITIES 9 (2006).
56. See Lucia Ona & Alison Davis, Economic Impact of the Critical Access Hospital
Program on Kentucky’s Communities, 27 J. RURAL HEALTH 21, 22–23 (2011).
57. Id. at 25.
58. Id.
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converting hospitals to CAHs greatly exceeded its costs. 59 These benefits
extended statewide, as the new CAH system created approximately 6,410 jobs,
along with $668.9 million in revenues. 60
Finally, in the face of physician shortages in rural areas, CAH status makes
higher levels of staffing in rural hospitals more affordable, thus helping to
alleviate physician shortages and to allow for more patients to access medical
care than customarily available in rural areas. 61 CAHs also demonstrate a level
of care at least as good as other rural hospitals, with high ratings for quality of
care, culture of safety, and work environment, and their nursing staff tend to
have more experience than other rural hospitals. 62
However, even in consideration of the benefits, a number of detriments to
CAH policy remain. Not only is the CAH program cost ineffective, but also it
may have parted from its original purpose in a way that will be self-defeating if
no policy changes are made.
2. The Detriments of CAH Designation
The detriments brought about by the CAH designation, like the benefits,
are significant. History has shown that RCR promotes more inefficient
behavior and less responsibility in cost management by providers. 63
Furthermore, the CAH program as enacted today no longer corresponds with
the original intentions of the program originally designed by Congress,
exacerbating the problems of inefficiency and cost management.
RCR has played a large role in promoting higher levels of inefficiency and
less responsibility in managing costs. When determining reimbursement
mechanisms for health care providers, Congress “believed that payment
mechanisms should (1) increase efficiency, (2) preserve financial viability of
efficient providers, (3) support access to high-quality care, and (4) make

59. See id.
60. Id.
61. ILL. CRITICAL ACCESS HOSP. NETWORK, supra note 55, at 19. See also and compare 42
C.F.R. § 485.604 (2014) (adding clinical nurse specialists as qualified staff to perform clinical
services at CAHs under the law), with Personnel Qualifications, 77 Fed. Reg. 29060 (May 16,
2012) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 485.604) (noting that the Conditions of Participation for
CAHs were revised to allow clinical nurse specialists to practice at CAHs).
62. Marianne Baernholdt et al., A Comparison of Quality of Care in Critical Access
Hospitals and Other Rural Hospitals, 14 ONLINE J. RURAL NURSING AND HEALTH CARE 3, 15,
19, 21 (2014), http://rnojournal.binghamton.edu/index.php/RNO/article/view/328.
63. Iustin Cristian Nedelea & James Matthew Fannin, Impact of Conversion to Critical
Access Hospital Status on Hospital Efficiency, 47 SOCIO-ECON. PLAN. SCI. 258, 264 (2013). See
also Michael D. Rosko & Ryan L. Mutter, Inefficiency Differences Between Critical Access
Hospitals and Prospectively Paid Rural Hospitals, 35 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 95, 118
(2010) (noting that CAHs tend toward inefficiency because they do not suffer the same financial
losses for high costs that are faced by non-CAHs under PPS reimbursement; when costs increase,
CAHs are simply paid more).
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equitable payments.” 64 Congress felt PPS did not encourage hospitals to meet
the second and third criteria, and it endeavored to structure the CAH payment
system to promote efficiency and quality care. 65 However, the implementation
of CAHs may have worked against the best of intentions. Once hospitals
converted to CAH status, they tended to become less efficient in managing
costs and allocating resources. 66 For some hospitals, cost inefficiency
increased as much as 21.85%. 67
Such inefficiencies drive up per-visit health care costs. For example, when
given the choice of two comparable treatments, the cost-efficient doctor will
choose the less costly of the two if the treatments are expected to have similar
outcomes. 68 However, in a cost-inefficient system, doctors will have no
incentive to choose the less costly method and will often choose the more
expensive of the two––a tendency that is exaggerated when the costs are fully

64. Rosko & Mutter, supra note 63, at 119.
65. Id.
66. Nedelea & Fannin, supra note 63, at 259 (showing that here, technical efficiency
reflected “the relationship between inputs used (i.e., capital and labor) and outputs produced (i.e.,
outpatient visits, inpatient days, surgeries, etc.). Allocative efficiency reflect[ed] the ability of a
hospital to produce a given level of outputs using the optimal combination of inputs (i.e., costminimizing), given input prices. A hospital [was considered] (overall) cost efficient when it [was]
both technically and allocatively efficient . . . indicat[ing] the extent to which the hospital
minimize[d] the cost of producing a specific level of outputs, given input prices.”). See also
Rosko & Mutter, supra note 63. The authors took into consideration that this inefficiency could
have been “a reflection of more cost-inefficient hospitals choosing to convert to CAH status.”
However, this inefficiency held even when the studied CAHs were compared to their pre-CAH
performance. Id. Furthermore, these comparisons still showed an increase in inefficiency over
time as CAHs participated in cost-based reimbursement. See id. Conversely, it is significant to
note that there was a negative, i.e., inverse relationship, between PPS reimbursement and
efficiency, suggesting that non-CAH hospitals participating in PPS reimbursement were
incentivized financially to achieve higher levels of cost efficiency. Id. See also Shriniwas Gautam
et al., Measuring the Performance of Critical Access Hospitals in Missouri Using Data
Envelopment Analysis, 29 J. RURAL HEALTH 150, 156 (2013). Finally, it must be noted that
inefficiency is an amorphous concept and difficult to both define and measure. See ACADEMY
HEALTH, EFFICIENCY IN HEALTH CARE: WHAT DOES IT MEAN? HOW IS IT MEASURED? HOW
CAN IT BE USED FOR VALUE-BASED PURCHASING? 2–3 (2006).
67. Rosko & Mutter, supra note 63, at 115 (stating that hospitals that had participated in the
CAH program for one year had a mean cost inefficiency of 13.33%, which increased each year
until the seventh year—when the maximum recorded inefficiency was 21.85%—and then
declined slightly to a mean of 20.24%).
68. GARY ROBBINS ET AL., NAT’L COMM. PHARMACISTS ASS’N, NCPA POL’Y REP. NO.
182, INEFFICIENCIES IN THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: WHAT CAN WE DO? 1 (April 1994). Such
inefficiencies arise, in part, because of our dependence on third parties to pay the medical bill,
which encourages overuse, as well as the fact that third-party reimbursement may provide less
coverage for lower-cost treatment options, distorting prices in a way that make the costlier option
appear more affordable to the patient. Id. at 1–3.
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covered, as in an RCR system. 69 In such systems, doctors have no incentive to
consider the additional cost of using a more expensive product or of utilizing
expensive inpatient hospital stays rather than outpatient facilities, raising
health care costs both for the patient and the third-party payer. 70 Consequently,
cost-based reimbursement has served as a driver for escalating health care
costs, 71 and history shows that the CAH program has not been a valuable
program in terms of promoting cost-efficiency. 72 Competition among CAHs
only exacerbates these inefficiencies, 73 and with the high level of
competition 74 currently facing CAHs, there may be more room for efficiency
improvement than presently indicated by CAHs’ thin financial margins. 75
In addition to the unnecessarily costly practices exhibited by CAHs, these
hospitals may have also drifted from their original design to the point where
many CAH-designated hospitals no longer fulfill their purpose as intended.
The CAH certification program was originally created to ensure that
vulnerable rural beneficiaries could obtain access to health care services. 76 To
ensure that it fulfilled this purpose and did not extend beyond the services
required by these vulnerable populations, the thirty-five mile rule was created,
69. Id. at 1.
70. Id. at 4.
71. Julie Barnes, Moving Away from Fee-for-Service, ATLANTIC (May 7, 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/05/moving-away-from-fee-for-service/256755/.
72. I. Cristian Nedelea and J. Matthew Fannin, Analyzing Cost Efficiency of Critical Access
Hospitals, 35 J.P. MODELING 183, 193 (2013). See also Asa B. Wilson et al., Financial
Performance Monitoring of the Technical Efficiency of Critical Access Hospitals: A Data
Envelopment Analysis and Logistic Regression Modeling Approach, 57 J. HEALTHCARE MGMT.
200, 206 (2012) (noting that only eighteen of 183 studied CAHs were operating efficiently). See
also generally Rosko & Mutter, supra note 63 (concluding that inefficiency increased as length of
participation in the CAH program continued).
73. See Rosko & Mutter, supra note 63, at 95, 114 (noting that price-based competition
tends to lower cost inefficiency). Though this is true for most health care organizations, which
under the Affordable Care Act rely on cost-efficiency to sustain profit margins, RCR tends to
increase inefficiency in CAHs by minimizing the incentives to reduce costs that comes with price
competition. See I. Cristian Nedelea et al., Selected Paper Presentation at the S. Agric. Econ.
Ass’n Annual Meeting: Cost Efficiency of Critical Access Hospitals 3 (2010). When cost is not
an issue, hospitals tend to engage in service-based competition rather than price-based
competition; such hospitals in more competitive settings employ costlier capital and equipment,
incurring higher costs. Id. at 16–17. CAH competition, due to the receipt of cost-based
reimbursement, mimics service-based competition rather than the more cost-efficient price-based
competition. Id.
74. See generally DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., MOST
CRITICAL ACCESS HOSPITALS WOULD NOT MEET THE LOCATION REQUIREMENTS IF REQUIRED
TO RE-ENROLL IN MEDICARE (Aug. 2013) (concluding that a great number of CAHs would not
meet the distance requirement if required to re-enroll, and therefore, face high levels of
competition with nearby CAHs).
75. Wilson et al., supra note 72, at 209–10.
76. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 74, at 1.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

334

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 10:323

requiring that each CAH be located not less than thirty-five miles from the
nearest hospital. 77 However, from 1997 until 2006, Congress permitted a
waiver of this distance requirement for hospitals deemed medically necessary
to local populations. 78 This waiver of the rule led to an explosion of CAHs, 79
creating competition detrimental to CAH functioning. Today, CAHs represent
approximately twenty-five percent of acute care hospitals in the United
States. 80 This competition has led to financial struggles as CAHs have
struggled to maintain sufficient patient flow and adequate payer mix 81 to cover
their costs. Furthermore, the large number of CAHs has led to a rural health
care environment more focused on competition to bring in sufficient patients
rather than the provision of care intended—a wasteful focus when costefficiency has become the presumption in federal reimbursement policies.
Such cost inefficiencies and the failure to adhere to the original purpose of
the CAH designation have led Congress to reconsider PPS reimbursement as
an option for CAHs. 82 These considerations have been heightened by
unsustainable rises in health care costs, as well as requests for budget cuts for
Medicare reimbursement programs. 83 The predominant fear of switching
CAHs to a prospective payment method of reimbursement is that the CAHs
would not survive this switch, leaving the most vulnerable populations in
America with no access to health care. 84 This next section explores the benefits
and challenges of switching to a PPS for CAHs, as well as the difficulties that
would arise politically should such a system be proposed and the potential
solutions for addressing these difficulties.

77. Id.
78. Id. at 3.
79. Id.
80. RURAL POL’Y RESEARCH INST. HEALTH PANEL, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS. VALUE-BASED PURCHASING PROGRAM AND CRITICAL ACCESS HOSPITALS 2 (Jan. 2009).
81. See generally GA. STATE OFFICE OF RURAL HEALTH, CRITICAL ACCESS HOSPITAL
FINANCIAL ANALYSES – 2009 3 (June 2010). This situation exemplifies the struggles CAHs face
when located too close to commercial health care organizations; here, the commercial
organizations tend to attract privately insured patients, while the remainder of the population—
usually containing a higher proportion of uninsured—tends to utilize CAH services. Id.
82. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING THE DEFICIT: SPENDING AND
REVENUE OPTIONS 53 (Mar. 2011) [hereinafter REDUCING THE DEFICIT]. See also generally
NAT’L HEALTH ADVISORY COMM. ON RURAL HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., IMPLICATIONS OF
PROPOSED CHANGES TO RURAL HOSPITAL PAYMENT DESIGNATIONS (Dec. 2012) [hereinafter
NAT’L HEALTH ADVISORY COMM.].
83. AHA SECTION FOR SMALL OR RURAL HOSPS., CAH UPDATE 1–3 (2015).
84. NAT’L HEALTH ADVISORY COMM., supra note 82, at 2; REDUCING THE DEFICIT, supra
note 82.
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III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PPS REIMBURSEMENT, THE CAH EXEMPTION, AND
THE OVER-DEPENDENCY OF CAHS ON RCR
CAHs were created as an exception to traditional PPS reimbursement in
order to provide rural services to more vulnerable, isolated rural populations.
However, as a result of the cost inefficiency and counterproductive competitive
practices, Congress has begun to reconsider CAH reimbursement for the
majority of existing CAHs. 85 In addition to a switch to PPS reimbursement,
policy recommendations have included implementing a modified value-based
purchasing system among CAHs as an incentive to improve performance, 86
lifting exemptions previously given that waived the thirty-five mile distance
requirement for certain rural hospitals, 87 and changing CAHs from RCR to a
PPS method of reimbursement. 88
Though the exceptional treatment of CAHs under the law has permitted
health care access to extend throughout rural America, as demonstrated in
Section II, the CAH system has presented a number of detriments as well. 89
Not only have CAHs become overly dependent on RCR rates, leading to cost
and resource allocation inefficiencies, but their operations have also drifted
from their original purpose as designed by Congress––to provide hospital
access to rural populations who would not otherwise have access to health
care. These detriments have led Congress to reconsider reimbursement
methods for CAHs.
PPS reimbursement compensates providers for expenses at predetermined,
fixed amounts. 90 Payment rates are based on the classification system of that
service, such as diagnosis-related groups for inpatient hospital services or casemix groups for inpatient rehabilitation hospitals. 91

85. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 74, at 7.
86. RURAL POL’Y RESEARCH INST. HEALTH PANEL, supra note 80, at 2–3, 7; NAT’L
ADVISORY COMM. ON RURAL HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., VALUE-BASED PURCHASING
DEMONSTRATIONS FOR CRITICAL ACCESS AND SMALL PPS HOSPITALS 1 (Sept. 2011)
[hereinafter VALUE-BASED PURCHASING].
87. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 74, at 2; Joe Carlson, Proposal to Strip
Critical-Access Status from Two-Thirds of Those Hospitals Called a Death Knell for Many,
MODERN HEALTHCARE 2 (Aug. 17, 2013), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20130817/
MAGAZINE/308179942.
88. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 82.
89. See generally AM. HOSP. ASS’N, TRENDWATCH: THE OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
FOR RURAL HOSPITALS IN AN ERA OF HEALTH REFORM (Apr. 2011).
90. Prospective Payment Systems – General Information, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/medicare/medicare-fee-for-service-payment/prospmedi
carefeesvcpmtgen/index.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2017).
91. Id. See also Medicare Prospective Payment Systems, AM. SPEECH-LANGUAGE-HEARING
ASS’N, http://www.asha.org/practice/reimbursement/medicare/pps_sum.htm (last visited Jan. 15,
2017).
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PPS reimbursement applies to the majority of health care providers, with
certain exceptions. 92 Separate PPSs are used for different types of hospitals,
such as acute inpatient hospitals, home health agencies, hospice, hospital
outpatient, inpatient psychiatric facilities, inpatient rehabilitation facilities,
long-term care hospitals, and skilled nursing facilities. 93 Among other goals, 94
PPS aims to encourage effective, efficient care without overutilization of
services by incentivizing managers to control the spending inefficiencies
produced by unnecessary tests and treatment. 95 Variations in PPS
reimbursement rates per hospital type attempt to reflect actual variations in the
costs of care between hospitals and services by reimbursing for factors
considered beyond the hospital’s control and not related to the hospital’s level
of efficiency, leaving health care organizations freer to strive for more efficient
standards where improvement is possible. 96 Additionally, payment rate
adjustments are available for variances in labor expenses, costly outlier
services, and rural areas where hospitals may experience more financial
stress. 97 These adjustments have been used to help smaller, more isolated
hospitals. 98 Payment rates, which are set by the Department of Health and
92. See Act of Dec. 13, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-210, 91 Stat. 1485 (showing that Medicarecertified rural health clinics are excluded from PPS); see also 42 C.F.R. § 419.2 (2010) (noting
services excluded from PPS); 42 C.F.R. § 412.23 (2011) (listing classifications of hospitals
excluded from PPS, including certain psychiatric hospitals, rehabilitation hospitals, children’s
hospitals, long-term care hospitals, cancer hospitals, and hospitals specially excluded—all of
which must meet specific requirements to apply for and maintain exclusion from PPS
reimbursement).
93. Id.
94. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OFFICE OF EVALUATION & INSPECTIONS, MEDICARE
HOSPITAL PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM: HOW DRG RATES ARE CALCULATED AND
UPDATED 3 (2001) (noting that in creating the PPS for hospital systems, Congress had four goals:
“(1) To ensure fair compensation for services rendered and not compromise access to hospital
services, particularly for the more seriously ill; (2) To ensure that the process for updating
payment rates would account for new medical technology, inflation, and other factors that affect
the cost of providing care; (3) To monitor the quality of hospital services for Medicare
beneficiaries; and (4) To provide a mechanism through which beneficiaries and hospitals could
resolve problems with their treatment”). These goals were intended to transform the way hospitals
thought about care delivery, because under the PPS system, the amount hospitals charged for
reimbursement no longer mattered; payments were capped. Id.
95. AM. SPEECH-LANGUAGE-HEARING ASS’N, supra note 91.
96. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, RURAL HOSPITALS AND MEDICARE’S PROSPECTIVE
PAYMENT SYSTEM 11 (Dec. 1991).
97. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., HOSPITAL OUTPATIENT PROSPECTIVE
PAYMENT SYSTEM 5 (Jan. 2016) [hereinafter PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM]. Note also that
different pay structures may be used for rural hospitals to ensure financial viability. Two
examples of this are the sole community hospital and the Medicare-dependent hospital, which
receive PPS reimbursement for all services except inpatient care. MEDPAC, supra note 15, at 4.
Additionally, PPS rates for these hospitals are based on historical costs trended forward. Id.
98. PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM, supra note 97.
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Human Services and are disclosed to the health care organization at the
beginning of the fiscal year, 99 cover expenses for defined periods of time, such
as per diem, per stay, or sixty-day episodes. 100
Congress enacted PPS reimbursement in 1983 as a response to soaring
health care costs under the existing Medicare system, which, at that time,
reimbursed hospitals on a generous retrospective cost basis. 101 This system
paid hospitals based on what the hospitals spent; however, the cost of care
began to outpace inflation rates, and the full reimbursements under the existing
retrospective payment system did little to incentivize efficiency or savings. 102
After enacting interim changes, Congress legislated the PPS under the Social
Security Act of 1983.
Though the PPS reduced reimbursement rates for the majority of health
care providers, certain hospitals could apply for exemptions from the system
based on economic and perceived societal needs, receiving RCR rates for
provided services instead of the traditional PPS reimbursement. 103 Hospitals
exempt from PPS initially included a number of short-stay hospitals,
psychiatric hospitals and units, rehabilitation hospitals and units, alcohol-drug
hospitals and units, long-term care hospitals, and children’s hospitals. 104 After
a rash of hospitals in rural areas began to close their doors in the 1980s and
1990s, 105 this exception was extended to create a new designation of
hospitals—CAHs.
However, since the establishment of CAHs, RCR has proven a detriment to
the system, and CAHs have become overly dependent on the high levels of
reimbursement. This over-dependency has led to increased cost inefficiency
and resource allocation, ultimately leading Congress to reconsider
reimbursement rates for CAHs to counteract these tendencies.
IV. THE POLICY BATTLE: WOULD PPS REIMBURSEMENT OF CAHS
DEVASTATE RURAL HEALTH CARE?
Changes in reimbursement rates are never easy political moves, and
switching CAHs to PPS reimbursement would likely present a struggle. This
same political battle was exemplified in the original switch to a PPS in 1983
and will be discussed next, along with the ramifications of the 1983 switch,
and how CAHs would likely fare under the proposed PPS today.

99. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 94.
100. Id.
101. Stuart Guterman & Allen Dobson, Impact of the Medicare Prospective Payment System
for Hospitals, 7 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 97, 97 (1986).
102. Id.
103. See generally 42 C.F.R. § 412.23 (2011).
104. Guterman & Dobson, supra note 101, at 100.
105. RURAL HEALTH, supra note 11.
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The Challenges of Switching to PPS Reimbursement

PPS reimbursement applies to most providers today, though it was not
always this way. Originally, the vast majority of hospitals were reimbursed on
a full or reasonable cost basis. 106 Rising health care costs eventually led to
reconsideration of such generous methods of reimbursement, and the first
hospitals were moved to the PPS in 1983. 107 These switches embroiled
Congress and the health care system in a political tug-of-war for funding. On
one side of the rope, Congress gestured towards ballooning health care costs
and dug in its heels, refusing to spend more funds in ways it already felt were
being wastefully used and hoping that payment reductions would incentivize
more efficient use of hospital resources. 108 On the other side, skeptical health
care providers feared that an unviable balance would be struck, with too little
reimbursement provided for services, and an over-abundance of faith in
hospitals’ ability to compensate. 109 Congress ultimately prevailed, and the
aftermath revealed a previously unfound ingenuity among health care
providers towards more efficient, quality health care services, as well as a
decrease in overall health care spending. 110 The reduction in funding
encouraged ultimately better, more cost-effective care, 111 and health care
survived. Since this initial political skirmish, the majority of health care
providers have been moved to PPS by Congress, with exceptions to this
reimbursement system still carved out for hospital systems deemed particularly
vulnerable, most notably, the majority of rural health care systems. 112 Now,
with most health care systems faring well on PPS reimbursement, even these
traditional exemptions are no longer secure as Congress continues to eye the
growing health care budget.
The challenges of switching CAHs from RCR to PPS reimbursement are
multi-faceted and are addressed here in two parts: first, the financial
implications on the CAH system of a reduction in reimbursement rates and,
second, how potential closures of CAHs might affect rural health outcomes.

106. Barnes, supra note 71.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1395WW (2006).
108. Robert F. Coulam & Gary L. Gaumer, Medicare’s Prospective Payment System: A
Critical Appraisal, (Supp. 1991) HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 45, 45. See also generally Guterman
& Dobson, supra note 101.
109. Coulam & Gaumer, supra note 108.
110. Id. at 48.
111. Id.
112. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.96 (2016).
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1. The Financial Implications of Reductions in Reimbursement Rates on
CAHs
Financial difficulties have long plagued rural hospitals. Though CAHs
represent over sixty percent of rural hospitals, the variation in financial status
between CAHs is significant. 113 Due to their small size and generally remote
location, CAH performance is particularly sensitive to changes in patient
revenue. 114
For example, there is some evidence that rural hospitals are less able to
cost-shift to private parties than urban hospitals. 115 Many believe that
compensation for government cutbacks occurs in the form of cost-shifting
towards private payers. 116 However, studies have shown that cost markups do
not vary significantly with financial pressures—at least, not enough to offset
costs generally. 117 Rather, evidence shows that hospitals tend to take measures
to reduce costs rather than cover their costs through markups. 118 These actions
include reducing personnel (resulting in smaller, more highly-skilled staff), 119
postponing pay increases, and limiting charity care. 120 Evidence demonstrated
initially successful results from cost-containment efforts in reducing length of
stay; however, mixed results were demonstrated regarding increases in
efficiency per patient stay. 121
In considering a switch to PPS reimbursement, it must also be noted that
PPS reimbursement rates are designed to reflect variations in costs among
hospitals resulting from factors beyond the hospital’s control and unrelated to
efficiency; thus, CAHs would receive higher rates of reimbursement under a
PPS than other hospitals might. 122 The cost-related factors for which a CAH
may receive additional reimbursement include types of medical conditions
treated and local labor costs, 123 as well as location, market forces, and costs of
113. George H. Pink et al., Variations in Financial Performance Among Peer Groups of
Critical Access Hospitals, 23 J. RURAL HEALTH 299, 299 (2007).
114. Id. at 304.
115. AM. HOSP. ASS’N, supra note 89, at 4–5.
116. Jack Hadley & Judith Feder, Hospital Cost Shifting and Care for the Uninsured, 4
HEALTH AFF. 67, 68 (1985). However, it must be noted that the evidence for cost-shifting is
mixed; it is likely more research is necessary in this area before firm conclusions may be drawn.
See Tamara Hayford & Lyle Nelson, CBO’s Analysis of Financial Pressures Facing Hospitals
Identifies Need for Additional Research on Hospitals’ Productivity and Responses,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/51920.
117. Hadley & Feder, supra note 116.
118. Id. at 68–69.
119. Eileen Appelbaum & Cherlyn Skromme Granrose, Hospital Employment Under Revised
Medicare Payment Schedules, 8 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 37, 44 (1986).
120. Hadley & Feder, supra note 116, at 75. See also Hayford & Nelson, supra note 116.
121. K. Davis et al., Is Cost Containment Working?, 4 HEALTH AFF. 81, 87 (1985).
122. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 96, at 11, 13.
123. Id. at 9.
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providing health care. 124 Moreover, rural hospitals are paid additional coverage
for historical cost differences with unknown causes. 125 Because of the unique
financial difficulties and health care costs faced by CAHs in comparison with
urban and non-CAH rural hospitals, CAHs would likely receive a higher PPS
reimbursement rate than currently is provided to other hospitals.
Still, even though evidence suggests that the CAH system could support a
switch to PPS in the long-term, it is likely that a switch to a PPS would lead
some CAHs to close in the short-term. 126 Accordingly, the effects of potential
CAH closures on rural health care systems is addressed next.
2. The Effects of Potential CAH Closures on Rural Health Care
Proposals to switch CAHs to PPS reimbursement have raised a number of
fears about potential hospital closures and maintaining access to care for rural
populations. Though a switch to PPS reimbursement for CAHs would lead to
the closure of some CAHs, 127 evidence suggests both that such closures would
not, in fact, reduce access to quality health care for America’s most vulnerable
rural populations 128 and that a reduction in competition and the conversion
from a RCR system to prospective payment would ultimately enhance
efficiency and incentivize cost savings and without reducing quality of care. 129
First, a closure of some CAHs would not likely lead to a reduction in
quality of care because not all CAHs may, in fact, be necessary for adequate
care provision in rural areas. 130 Initially, it was required that all CAHs be
located no less than thirty-five miles from the nearest hospital or no less than
fifteen miles in areas with mountainous terrain. 131 However, from 1997 to
2005, states could waive this requirement for hospitals designated as
“necessary” health service providers. 132 Following 2006, hospitals again had to
meet the distance requirements; however, exemptions were given for those
hospitals constructed during the 1997-2005 waiver period. 133 Because of these

124. NAT’L RURAL HEALTH RES. CTR., CRITICAL ACCESS HOSPITAL FINANCE 101
MANUAL 8 (2012).
125. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 96, at 13.
126. Michelle M. Casey et al., Minimum-Distance Requirements Could Harm HighPerforming Critical-Access Hospitals And Rural Communities, 34 HEALTH AFF. 627, 631–32
(2015).
127. Id. at 632–33.
128. Rosko & Mutter, supra note 63, at 122.
129. Id.
130. J. Matthew Fannin & I. Cristian Nedelea, Performance of the Critical Access Hospital
Program: Lessons Learned for Future Rural Hospital Effectiveness in a Changing Health Policy
Landscape, 28 CHOICES 1, 1 (2013).
131. Casey et al., supra note 126, at 627.
132. Id.
133. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2017]

BELLING THE CAT

341

exemptions granted, the number of CAHs exploded during the initial years. 134
Many of these “necessary provider” hospitals were constructed within the
thirty-five mile proximity requirements. Currently, two-thirds of CAHs are
within the thirty-five mile requirement and would not meet the requirements to
retain critical access certification if required to re-enroll in Medicare. 135 Of the
846 CAHs that would not meet the distance requirement, 306 were located
within fifteen miles of the nearest hospital. 136 Of these, 235 were between ten
and fourteen miles of the nearest hospital, while the other seventy-one were
less than ten miles from the nearest hospital. 137
The close proximity of such a large number of CAHs has spurned
competition between CAH hospitals, increasing financial struggles. 138 In light
of this, a reassessment of CAH criteria resulting in a switch to a PPS would not
necessarily endanger rural health care. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) has already begun to consider whether to reassess the
certification of these CAH hospitals––an act projected to save Medicare and its
beneficiaries $449 million, even if only hospitals less than fifteen miles from
each other were considered for reevaluation. 139 Implementation of PPS
reimbursement for these CAHs (or, as discussed by CMS, stripping these
hospitals completely of CAH status) would lead to short-term high rates of
closure due to a reduction in profit margins. 140 However, these closures would
occur primarily as a result of the underlying competition, exposed by a change
in reimbursement rates. 141
A switch to PPS reimbursement, even just for the hospitals specifically
addressed by CMS, would draw CAHs back into the boundaries of their
original purpose as designed by Congress. Originally, the thirty-five mile
distance requirement was calculated to balance the health care access of
isolated rural populations with efficient federal budgeting: Congress desired to
bring hospitals into areas that were considered financially unviable. However,
to add more hospitals would introduce competition among providers in already

134. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 74, at 3–4.
135. Id. at 12. “Overall, 849 of the 1,329 CAHs (64 percent) would not meet the location
requirements if required to re-enroll in Medicare. The vast majority of these CAHs would not
meet the distance requirement, and only three of these CAHs would not meet the rural
requirementFalseOf the 846 CAHs that would not meet the distance requirement . . . 306 were
located a drive of 15 or fewer miles from their nearest hospitals or other CAHs. Of these CAHs,
235 were between 10-14 miles from their nearest hospitals or other CAHs. The other 71 CAHs
were less than a 10-mile drive from their nearest hospitals or other CAHs.” Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. GA. STATE OFFICE OF RURAL HEALTH, supra note 81.
139. See DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 74, at 16.
140. Casey et al., supra note 126, at 633.
141. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 96, at 7–8.
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sparsely populated areas and would reduce budgetary efficiency, while fewer
hospitals would result in a lack of access to care. 142 The thirty-five mile
distance requirement was a compromise between the two. Nevertheless,
hospitals took advantage of the system and began to request waivers of the
distance requirement so they could still obtain CAH status. 143 This CAH
waiver was in effect until January 1, 2006 and allowed for CAHs to build at
distances as close as ten miles from one another. 144 As a result, nearly twothirds of CAHs today would not meet the thirty-five mile distance requirement.
These findings are important. The close proximity of CAHs in sparselypopulated areas has led to fierce competition in an effort to maintain open
doors, 145 which has led hospitals to spend money inefficiently or promote more
costly procedures to their patients in an attempt to attract patients from the
sparse surrounding populations. 146 These sorts of competitive practices tend to
raise the cost of health care, both for the patient and for the third-party
payers. 147
Because CAHs in close proximity compete for the same small groups of
patients, hospital closures resulting from competitive proximity between
hospitals would not notably affect access to needed health care services. 148
One study examined forty-one rural hospitals that closed in 1989 and found
that twenty-six were located twenty miles or less from another hospital, and
only three were located thirty or more miles from another hospital. 149 Though
the closures may have reduced some access to physicians and emergency

142. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 74, at 19.
143. See Casey et al., supra note 126, at 627.
144. Memorandum from Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. to State Survey Agency Dirs.,
Critical Access Hospitals (CAHs): Distance from Other Providers and Relocation of CAHs with a
Necessary Provider Designation (Sept. 7, 2007), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Provider-Enroll
ment-and-Certification/SurveyCertificationGenInfo/downloads/SCLetter07-35.pdf.
145. George M. Holmes et al., The Effect of Rural Hospital Closures on Community
Economic Health, 41 HEALTH SERV. RES. 467, 482–83 (2006).
146. See Rosko & Mutter, supra note 63, at 114.
147. Id. at 97. Rosko and Mutter note:
Medicare payments to CAHs rose at an annualized growth rate of 9.5 percent from
1998 to 2003, compared to a 3.3 percent growth rate for similar hospitals that did not
convert to CAH status and were paid prospectively. As a result, Medicare paid
approximately $850,000 more per CAH in 2003 than it would have if payment had
increased at the rate of nonconverting, comparison hospitals. MedPAC estimates that the
difference was nearly $1 million per hospital in 2006. This amounts in total to a projected
$1.3 billion in Medicare payments above what would have been made under prospective
payment.
Id. (internal citation omitted). These increases in reimbursements were ultimately due to rising
costs of care. Id. at 98.
148. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 96, at 8.
149. Id.
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services, the study concluded that the closings did not affect overall care
because alternative hospitals remained available to receive patients. 150
Further, even a high rate of closures would not likely change health care
outcomes for these populations. 151 During the original shifts to PPS
reimbursement among some rural hospitals, which had originally received
RCR, 152 a string of rural hospitals began to close their doors for good. 153 Yet,
health outcomes and access to care remained largely unaffected by this new
policy due to the fact that a majority of the hospital closures occurred as a
result of surreptitiously fierce competition. 154 This longstanding competition
had been quietly cloaked by generous reimbursement policies that, once pulled
back, revealed the underlying wasteful expenditures churned out by hospitals
to attract the same scarce populations. 155
B.

The Benefits of a Switch to a PPS for CAHs

A switch to PPS reimbursement would likely encourage higher quality care
and increased cost efficiency. As aptly stated by the National Rural Health
Association, “[f]orm follows finance: regardless of the type system, providers
will conform to ‘how the money flows’. Innovative models of care delivery
and providers will be an outcome associated with changes in reimbursement
practices.” 156 Studies of the effects on previous hospitals of a switch from costbased reimbursement to a PPS support this conclusion. In the first year of PPS
implementation in 1983, PPS-participating hospitals were able to significantly
decrease the length of patient stays, 157 an indicator often consulted as a
measure of efficiency. Whereas the largest previous drop in length of stay had
only been four percent, in 1984, length of stay dropped by nine percent. 158
With the implementation of the PPS, hospitals experienced significantly lower
occupation rates, with an average occupation rate of 67.7% (down from
73.7%). 159 With repeated demonstrations of decreases in patient length of stay

150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 96, at 7.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. NAT’L RURAL HEALTH ASS’N, POLICY BRIEF: THE FUTURE OF RURAL HEALTH 1, 8
(Feb. 2013).
157. Guterman & Dobson, supra note 101. See also Yi-Wen Tsai et al., The Effect of
Changing Reimbursement Policies on Quality of In-Patient Care, From Fee-for-Service to
Prospective Payment, 17 INT’L J. QUALITY HEALTH CARE 421, 423 (2005); Peter J. Huckfeldt et
al., Effects of Medicare Payment Reform: Evidence from the Home Health Interim and
Prospective Payment Systems, 34 J. HEALTH ECON. 1, 2 (2014).
158. Guterman & Dobson, supra note 101, at 103–04.
159. Id. at 104.
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as well as admissions, 160 it is likely that CAHs would experience these same
efficiency savings under PPS reimbursement.
Additionally, PPS is intended to encourage collaboration, 161 and
reimbursement changes have been shown to facilitate improvement discussions
within organizations, as well as to align these organizations to provide more
patient-centered and proactive care, to leverage provider expertise to deliver
more efficient care, and to improve the overall quality of care. 162 These
incentives are furthered by the current focus on programs such as value-based
purchasing, which seeks to tie reimbursement funds to the quality of care
produced by hospitals. 163 Thus, a switch to PPS reimbursement would likely
encourage greater collaboration and systemization among rural hospitals,
facilitating financial viability and quality patient care.
Finally, PPS has been shown to better hospital processes, including clinical
documentation processes. 164 One Dallas hospital began to find smarter ways to
utilize the hospital’s electronic health records (EHR) to run patient reports;
they also redesigned EHR templates to try to improve the quality of patient
treatment information captured in notes and to improve note-taking efficiency
by physicians. 165 These endeavors, inspired by a switch to PPS reimbursement,
encouraged successful changes to improve hospital process flow. Likewise,
financial pressures under a PPS could incentivize CAHs to improve process
flows and record-keeping procedures.
In light of the benefits presented by a potential switch to PPS
reimbursement, policymakers and providers must note that RCR is not
necessarily the only, or the best, remedy to prevent CAH closure or to maintain
access to rural health care. 166 Under the current CAH system, RCR has served
as only one method to provide a safety net for vulnerable hospitals. Evidence

160. See Tsai et al., supra note 157; see also Huckfeldt et al., supra note 157, at 17.
161. Press Release, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., CMS Announces Sites for a
Demonstration to Encourage Greater Collaboration and Improve Quality Using Bundled Hospital
Payment (Jan. 7, 2009), https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Press-releases/
2009-Press-releases-items/2009-01-07.html.
162. Eduardo Lacson, Jr. & Raymond M. Hakim, The 2011 ESRD Prospective Payment
System: Perspectives From Fresenius Medical Care, a Large Dialysis Organization, 57 AM. J.
KIDNEY DISEASE, 547, 547–48 (2011).
163. Linking Quality to Payment, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcom
pare/linking-quality-to-payment.html (last visited August 7, 2016).
164. Joseph Goedert, New Payment System Compels Better Clinical Documentation, HEALTH
DATA MGMT. (Oct. 29, 2013, 9:54 AM) http://www.healthdatamanagement.com/news/new-pay
ment-system-compels-better-clinical-documentation.
165. Id.
166. See Rosko & Mutter, supra note 63, at 199 (noting that even if hospitals benefit
financially through the CAH program, at the end of the day, they must operate profitably in order
to survive, suggesting that other considerations such as effective financial management remain
imperative).
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supports that it is not the best, or even the better, option to provide financial
relief for struggling rural hospitals. 167 A cost-benefit analysis taking into
account the current inefficiencies of CAHs, as well as the benefits
demonstrated by hospitals currently operating under PPS, points to PPS as a
viable long-term solution for rural health care providers. Thus, political actors
and stakeholders must not grasp too firmly at a familiar system that presents
some benefits but, ultimately, may not be the better answer to rural health care
provision. Though CAHs would likely face interim struggles during a switch to
PPS reimbursement, they would ultimately overcome these challenges to
survive long-term, and such changes would likely inspire more efficient, costeffective, quality care.
IV. RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGES OF MOVING CAHS TO PPS
REIMBURSEMENT
Though evidence supports that CAHs would likely survive the interim
difficulties they would face with a switch to PPS reimbursement, there are
several actions that CAHs may take to help ensure their financial viability.
The first actions to ensure the survival of rural hospitals deemed most
critical would likely occur in the realm of policy. These policy solutions
include a modified PPS reimbursement rate, legal redefinitions (and stricter
enforcement) of distance requirements, easing of certain regulatory burdens,
and state modification of laws governing health practitioners’ scope of
practice.
In response to a shift to PPS reimbursement, a modified reimbursement
rate might assist in ensuring CAH survival. Regardless of potential benefits of
a shift to PPS reimbursement, the fact remains that rural hospitals are less able
to shift costs to private payers to account for cuts in reimbursement rates, as
the majority of their patients tend to be publicly insured. 168 This characteristic
sets them apart from their urban counterparts, who are better able to shift costs
when under financial strain. A tailored PPS reimbursement rate, where CAHs
receive more compensation than is currently provided upon meeting certain
criteria, though not to the extent of RCR, would help to ease strain due to costshifting inabilities. 169 Such modified reimbursement rates might avert potential
financial hardship while also encouraging efficiency and cost-savings. This
modified reimbursement rate might come in the form of a version of valuebased purchasing, which could provide the additional benefit of incentivizing
quality and cost-efficiency—qualities historically difficult to promote under

167. Id.
168. Shannon Muchmore, Legislation Languishes as Rural Hospitals Struggle, MOD.
HEALTHCARE (Oct. 3, 2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20151003/MAGAZINE/
310039980.
169. See generally REDUCING THE DEFICIT, supra note 82.
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traditional Medicare reimbursement. 170 However, value-based purchasing
methods would need to be adapted for the rural communities, as historically it
has been difficult to translate these methods from urban providers to their rural
market counterparts. 171
Second, legally redefining distance requirements for CAHs might alleviate
the tension in some areas straining to provide care to more isolated rural
residents. Though the thirty-five mile standard was originally established to
provide a balance between access to care and unnecessary competition, some
counties have still struggled to maintain accessible care for their communities
under these requirements. 172 In 2007, a bill was introduced in Congress to
reduce the thirty-five mile requirement for CAHs to thirty miles; however, this
bill was referred to the Subcommittee on Health after a few days and has not
been brought up since. 173 It is not likely to be addressed any time soon.
However, this is one action that might be taken to enhance financial viability
by “strik[ing] a [better] balance between convenient access to. . .care and
unnecessary competition.” 174
Furthermore, financial solutions may still be available for CAHs who
switch to PPS reimbursement. First, instead of simply shifting CAHs from one
system of payment (RCR) to another (PPS), Congress could restructure CAHs
to reflect the payment systems for sole community hospitals (SCHs) or
Medicare-dependent hospitals (MDHs). These hospitals receive cost-based
payments only for inpatient services and receive modified PPS reimbursements
that are based on historical costs trended forward. 175 This encourages costsavings, as reimbursements do not increase when costs increase. 176
Furthermore, the conditions of participation for SCHs and MDHs are similar to
those already required of CAHs, 177 facilitating a potential restructuring of
CAHs to reflect one of these two systems.
Another solution might come through the easing and restructuring of
regulatory burdens on CAH operations and staffing. In 2012, Congress
attempted to ease regulatory burdens on CAHs, thus permitting them to devote

170. VALUE-BASED PURCHASING, supra note 86.
171. NAT’L RURAL HEALTH ASS’N, supra note 156, at 3–4.
172. Change in Mileage Requirement for Hospitals Could Assist Rural Areas, DEMOPOLIS
TIMES (May 30, 2007), http://www.demopolistimes.com/2007/05/30/change-in-mileage-require
ment-for-hospitals-could-assist-rural-areas/.
173. See H.R. 2322, 110th Cong. (2007).
174. DEMOPOLIS TIMES, supra note 172.
175. MEDPAC, supra note 15, at 2.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1–3.
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resources to providing care to vulnerable populations. 178 These provisions
included increased flexibility in meeting conditions of participation for special
reimbursement rates: for example, by broadening the concept of “medical
staff” to allow smaller hospitals to include other practitioners as staff in
accordance with state law; 179 permitting podiatrists to participate in medical
staff leadership; 180 permitting self-administration of certain medications; 181
and eliminating requirements that CAHs furnish diagnostic, therapeutic,
laboratory, radiology, and emergency procedures directly by CAH staff. 182
This rule reduced the total regulatory burden experienced by CAHs and similar
hospitals by nearly five billion dollars over the next five years, with the
greatest potential cost savings stemming from changes to the conditions of
participation. 183 These savings would likely permit greater flexibility in policy
changes, alleviating some concerns about shortfalls in revenue. However,
additional modifications could be made. For example, easing of federal
licensure and certification processes might reduce operation costs and barriers
to care. 184 Under licensure and certification requirements, there is little room
for rural hospitals to invest in innovative approaches to care, creating high
health care costs for rural hospitals even though rural health care remains less
expensive per beneficiary. 185 Additionally, regulations could be restructured to
support a more patient-centered focus appropriate to clusters of rural
communities, allowing for prioritization of services tailored to community
needs, rather than the current provider-centered focus that predominates. 186
Regulatory incentives, perhaps financial, to establish rural health care networks
may also provide a vital component to ensuring CAH survival. 187

178. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Reform of Hospital and Critical Access Hospital
Conditions of Participation, 77 Fed. Reg. 95, 29034 (May 16, 2012) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
§§ 482, 485).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 29035.
183. 77 Fed. Reg. at 29035. (“The rule will reduce the total regulatory burden for hospitals
and CAHs by nearly $940 million initially and by almost $5 billion over the next five years.
Changes to the following CoPs accounted for the greatest potential savings in the final rule: §
482.22, Medical staff ($330 million); § 482.23, Nursing services ($110 million); § 482.24,
Medical record services ($170 million); and § 482.54, Outpatient services ($300 million).”).
184. NAT’L RURAL HEALTH ASS’N, supra note 156, at 3.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 6.
187. Id. at 8.
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Moreover, CAHs have demonstrated success in garnering additional
revenue by diversifying medical procedures offered. 188 This diversification
may be necessary to offset shrinking patient visits and revenues. 189 CAHs have
already begun to diversify their revenue streams to bring in additional patient
groups and to better adapt to local community needs. 190 Local collaborative
partnerships with larger hospitals have provided further opportunity for
revenue stream diversification. 191 This will become even more important as
health care reform progresses, particularly in states that have expanded
Medicaid programs and patient demand rises that may strain limited
resources. 192 Currently, CAHs most often offer services such as primary group
practices, long-term care facilities, and specialty facilities such as orthopedic
units, general surgical units, and oncology. 193 Still, concerns such as financial
risk, lack of specialists available to work full-time in more isolated areas, and
competition between entities have made revenue stream diversification more
difficult. 194 These concerns have been somewhat mitigated by strategic
partnerships; for example, in some cases, a third party such as a county will
own the facilities, which are operated day-to-day by the CAHs. 195 Such
partnerships have allowed for the addition of services such as dental offices,
community health centers, mental health practices, emergency medical
services, and retail pharmacies, where it is in the interest of the CAH to offer
such services. 196
In correspondence with procedure diversification, CAHs could improve
their financial situation by following the national shift 197 to a focus on
preventive and primary care, rather than tertiary care. As noted by the National
Rural Health Association:
The broad goal of rural health advocates should be to improve the health of
rural people. There is recognition that good health is determined by more than
just access to acute health services. Prevention, health improvement strategies,
and social determinants of health are profoundly important. Without

188. GA. STATE OFFICE OF RURAL HEALTH, supra note 81, at 2. Though diversification
efforts have been unique for each hospital, they have included components such as swing beds,
rural health clinics, and skilled nursing facilities. Id.
189. Id.
190. Melissa Henriksen et al., Illinois Critical Access Hospital Program: Learning from the
Past, Building the Future, ILL. CRITICAL ACCESS HOSP. NETWORK, Jan. 2015, at 1, 8.
191. Id. at 8–9.
192. See AM. HOSP. ASS’N, supra note 89, at 1.
193. Henriksen et al., supra note 190, at 8–9.
194. Id. at 9.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 8.
197. See Regina M. Benjamin, The National Prevention Strategy: Shifting the Nation’s
Health-Care System, 126 PUB. HEALTH REP. 774, 774–75 (2011).
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recognizing that the population segments are diverse and without addressing
those conditions that drive disparities, realistic expectations and strategies for
long-term improvement in health cannot be sufficiently defined, let alone
198
achieved. Health related costs cannot be managed, let alone minimized.

With health care reform and the subsequent redesigning of health care
delivery models, preventive care as a tool to promote population health and
reduce health care costs is becoming more important. 199 The ideal rural health
care system—one that would maximize health care resources while minimizing
costs—would promote and allow increased access to prevention and screening
services that would prevent or delay the onset of the chronic diseases that so
heavily burden rural communities. 200
Finally, shrewd cost-cutting and efficiency implementation processes may
ease budget tensions in shifting to a PPS method of reimbursement. Health
care administrators tend to launch into cost-cutting measures that seem
intuitive but are, in reality, counterproductive, ultimately leading to higher
costs and lower-quality care. 201 Often, thin financial margins in health care
organizations are a consequence not of insufficient reimbursement, but instead
“are the result of mismatched capacity, fragmented delivery, suboptimal
outcomes, and inefficient use of highly skilled clinical and technical staff.”202
Ultimately, avoiding these common mistakes requires active collaboration in
cost-measurement and management not just between administrators and
suppliers, but also between administrators and clinicians. 203 It may also require
a realistic recognition that not all services currently provided to rural
populations are necessary. The National Rural Health Association addresses
this issue directly, asserting:

198. NAT’L RURAL HEALTH ASS’N, supra note 156.
199. RURAL POL’Y RES. INST. & ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FNDN., THE HIGH PERFORMANCE
RURAL HEALTH CARE SYSTEM OF THE FUTURE 3 (Sept. 2011).
200. Id.
201. Robert S. Kaplan & Derek A. Haas, How Not to Cut Health Care Costs, HARV. BUS.
REV., Nov. 2014, at 117, 118–22 (noting that the five most common mistakes that health care
administrators make when cutting costs are (1) cutting back on support staff which can
immediately lower costs, but can also be “shortsighted” by lowering clinicians’ productivity and
significantly increasing the costs of administrative tasks and patient treatments; (2)
underinvestment in space and equipment, which tends to shift costs by creating longer wait times
and lower volumes of patients treated and, consequently, lower revenues; (3) focusing too
narrowly on the negotiating prices of supplies while failing to control potentially wasteful
utilization of these supplies; (4) limiting office visits to specific fixed time periods, such as fifteen
or thirty minutes, which ultimately promoted longer inpatient stays and higher rehabilitation
costs, and (5) failing to benchmark and standardize costs and clinical and administrative
processes, which can result in costs for similar services that vary between hospitals by more than
five hundred percent).
202. Id. at 122.
203. Id.
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It is easy to say that rural residents should have ready access to all of the
identified services and referral linkages to more specialized providers and
facilities. However, in many cases neither the local capacity nor the referral
resources and linkages are adequate. To state that all identified resources
should just ‘be there’ is overly simplistic. This does not mean that we should
lower our sights. It does mean that in rural areas, priority should be given to
putting in place the identified building blocks and securing the resources
204
necessary for their sustainability.

In an area of limited resources, it is vital to recognize these limitations
when creating policy. Recognition of these limitations will ultimately aid in
providing more cost-effective use of available resources and may play a key
role in ensuring the survival of needed rural health care services.
Each of these solutions provides a viable option to offset potential costs
incurred by switching from RCR for CAHs to a PPS method of reimbursement.
Still, the most daunting challenge to address would be a political one. The
ramifications of switching CAHs to PPS reimbursement are positive in the
long-term. However, in light of the short-term financial difficulties that will
ensue, the question remains: who is to bell the cat?
Aesop’s witty fable aptly shows that even the better ideas often propose an
unconsidered but daunting challenge. 205 Though, in reality, a switch to PPS
reimbursement would likely benefit rural health care long-term, the painful
short-term consequences make such a move a great idea in theory, but
practically undesirable to enact. The challenges intimated by PPS
reimbursement, though not impossible to overcome, bring with them the
equally intimidating challenge as to who will dare face the opposition of many
provider, patient, and physician groups to enact what might certainly be seen
as an uncertain, if not devastating, remedy. Cuts to health care spending are
notoriously difficult to implement and even more so for populations perceived
as vulnerable, which are generally exempted from such cuts. 206
Providers will initially feel the blade of health care reimbursement cuts and
will likely struggle under the pressure to provide quality services more costefficiently––a prospect that has left policymakers and patients fearing they will
be left without access to care. This fear of cutting health care funds is deeply
interwoven with the perception that vulnerable populations will be left
destitute and unviable. Unless and until these unsavory but exaggerated
perceptions are addressed honestly by providers and fully confronted by

204. NAT’L RURAL HEALTH ASS’N, supra note 156, at 9.
205. See id. at 4.
206. See Social Security Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-210, 91 Stat. 1485 (Dec. 13, 1977) (to
be codified at 42 U.S.C. 1395k); 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(S)(ii)(III) (2012). See also generally
ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, REDUCING COSTS AND IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF
HEALTH CARE (2013).
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policymakers with the benefits of a switch demonstrated as fully as feasibly
possible prior to implementation, such a conversion may be long in coming.
V. CONCLUSION
There is not, and there will never be, a perfect remedy for the United States
health care system; there are only better alternatives. Furthermore, with soaring
health care costs, there remains a dire and growing need for greater
responsibility in government management of taxpayer dollars to control
spending and for hospitals to be held accountable to responsible spending.
Ultimately, a switch to PPS for CAHs would not prove the crippling blow
predicted. Not only would CAHs survive, but a PPS would also encourage
more cost-efficient, quality care. However, it is not so easy to “bell the cat.” In
considering a move to PPS reimbursement for CAHs, American policymakers
must fully confront and address both the risks and fears involved in this policy
move if America is to move forward with such a system.
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